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and the R. R. Trainmen decision should cause recognition of the
benefits available through lay intermediaries and encourage
modification of traditional blanket opposition to their activities
to the extent consistent with effective avoidance of abuse.
Courts: State Courts Cannot Restrain
Federal Court In Personam Relitigation
Petitioners,' a group of Dallas citizens, brought suit in a
Texas court to restrain the City of Dallas from building an ad-
ditional runway for its municipal airport and from selling bonds
to finance the construction. Under Texas law, the issuance of
municipal bonds is automatically stopped when a suit challeng-
ing their validity is filed? Summary judgment was given for the
city; the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed;' the Supreme
Court of Texas denied review;4 and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.' Petitioners filed another action in fed-
eral district court seeking similar relief and again stopped the
issuance of the bonds. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals then
enjoined petitioners from prosecuting their federal suit. Peti-
1. Plaintiffs originally included 46 Dallas citizens, including their counsel,
Donovan. Later, at the time of filing the action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, plaintiffs were 120 Dallas citizens,
including 27 of the original claimants. Petitioners were the 87 of the 120
plaintiffs who were convicted of contempt. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377
U.S. 408-10 (1964).
2. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 1269j-5, § 3 (Supp. 1956) authorizes muni-
cipal airport revenue bonds and provides in part as follows: "The Revenue
Bonds . . . shall not be finally issued until approved by the Attorney General
of Texas and registered by the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State
of Texas, and after such approval shall be incontestable." As explained by
the Texas Supreme Court in its opinion in the instant case, the Attorney
General does not approve issuance as long as the bond validity is under
attack in pending litigation. City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919, 925
(Tex. 1963).
S. Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
4. TExAs WmREs OF ERRoR TABsm at 105.
5. Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
6. After petitioners filed the second suit in the federal district court, the
city applied to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of prohibition to
bar petitioners from prosecuting their case in the federal court. The Texas
court denied relief holding that it was without power to enjoin petitioners
and that the defense of res judicata on which the city relied could be raised
and adjudicated in the federal court. City of Dallas v. Brown, 362 S.W.2d
372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). The Texas Supreme Court reversed. City of
Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1963). The Texas Court of Civil
Appeals subsequently enjoined petitioners from further prosecution in the
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tioners continued the suit and were convicted of contempt.1 The
United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the Texas
court could not enjoin petitioners from relitigating their in per-
sonam action in a federal court. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377
U.S. 408 (1964).8
The jurisdictional interrelationship of state and federal courts
within the American judicial framework of concurrent jurisdic-
tion has been a matter of continuing concern. Section 5 of the
Judiciary Act of 1793 attempted to insure the independence of
state courts by prohibiting federal injunctions staying state court
proceedings.9 Although absolute in its terms, this anti-injunction
statute has been tempered in its application by subsequent
amendments"o and judicial exceptions. The enactment related
only to federal injunctions against state proceedings, and the
converse problem of state injunctions against federal proceedings
has never been directly regulated by federal statute.' Nor have
the federal courts denied to state courts the right to exercise re-
ciprocal injunctive powers where concurrent jurisdiction exists.
The state courts have conformed to the injunctive pattern of the
federal courts, although the reasons for their conformance are
not clear. 2
federal court. See City of Dallas v. Brown, S68 S.W.2d 240, 242-43 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963).
7. City of Dallas v. Brown, 368 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
8. The Court did not rule on the res judicata question -but left it to be
decided by the federal district court in the trial of the second suit. 377 U.S.
at 412.
9. Section 5 read in part: . . . nor shall a writ of injunction be granted
to stay proceedings in any court of a state . . . ." 1 Stat. 3835 (1793).
10. In 1911 the statute was amended to permit injunctions where author-
ized by any law relating to bankruptcy proceedings. 86 Stat. 1162 (1911).
11. Presumably Congress could legislate against state injunctions staying
proceedings in federal courts, although it has never done so. Congress has
the power to define the jurisdiction of federal courts. U.S. CoNsT. art. III,
§ 1. It would seem that this power to define jurisdiction and the supremacy
clause would allow Congress to prevent state interference with federal court
proceedings.
12. See Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939); Pennsylvania
Gen. Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189 (1935); Harkin v. Brundage,
276 U.S. 36 (1928); Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118 (1909); Reagan v. Dick,
76 Colo. 544, 233 Pac. 159 (1925); Prugh v. Portsmouth Say. Bank, 48 Neb.
414, 67 N.W. 809 (1896); Keith v. Alger, 114 Tenn. 1, 85 S.W. 71 (1905).
At least two rationales have been advanced to justify the conformance.
One is founded upon the desire for efficient and harmonious operation within
a dual judicial system. To achieve this, some assurance of a minimum of
interference between courts, including injunctive authority for each court to
isolate and protect its judicial functions, is required. Because avoidance of
the evils of interference is as essential to one court system as to the other,
1964] 345
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A doctrine of mutual equality was recognized early in Riggs
v. Johnson County" where the Supreme Court, after noting the
independence of federal and state courts, characterized their
respective processes as being as far beyond the reach of the
other as if a physical boundary divided them.'- More recent
evidence of the mutual equality of federal and state injunctive
powers is found in the availability to state courts of a
judicially declared exception to the federal anti-injunction
statute. Under this exception, federal courts could issue injunc-
tions if the federal court first took custody of property - cases
classified as in rem or quasi in rem.' 5 The converse proposition
that a state court, having first taken custody of property, could
enjoin subsequent res proceedings in a federal court, was estab-
lished in Princess Lida v. Thompson.' The res case rationale was
that the commencement of an action in the first court and that
court's exercise of control over the res resulted in its being un-
available for control or disposition by a second court 7 This ex-
ception has been regarded as an essential corollary to the mutual
there is no reason to distinguish between state and federal injunctive powers
-and the rules should apply reciprocally. Since federal injunctions inter-
fering with state court proceedings are limited by statute, a doctrine of
reciprocity requires the states to look to the federal statute to determine
state injunctive powers. Note, Limitations on State Judicial Interference With
Federal Activities, 51 CoLVm. L. REv. 84 (1951).
The other rationale is based upon the theoretical ground that, in the
absence of statute, both federal and state courts would be without injunctive
restrictions; that only the federal courts are directly restricted by statute;
but that under a doctrine of comity the state courts consider themselves
limited to the same extent as the federal courts. Note, State Injunctions
Against Proceedings in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 714 (1942).
For a summary of the development of judicial comity in this area, see War-
ren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HAnv. L. REV. 345 (1980).
The argument over state power is represented on the one side by Story's
oft-quoted statement that "the State Courts cannot enjoin proceedings in
the Courts of the United States," 2 STony, EQmer JRISPUDnNcE 900, at
186 (1st ed. 1836), and on the other side by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's state-
ment in his dissenting opinion in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44,
56 (1941), referring to "the discredited notion that there is a general lack of
power in the state courts to enjoin proceedings in the federal courts."
For a good discussion of the development of the injunctive powers, see
Note, 51 COLum. L. REV. 84 (1951); Note, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 714 (1942).
13. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867).
14. Id. at 195-96.
15. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939) (dictum); Julian v.
Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904); see Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118
(1909).
16. Supra note 15; of. Palmer v. Texas, supra note 15.
17. Princess Lida v. Thompson, supra note 15; Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U.S. 926 (1922) (dictum); Palmer v. Texas, supra note 15.
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noninterference principle underlying the anti-injunction statute
and as equally applicable to both state and federal courts's
Federal courts which had fully adjudicated an action were
also permitted to enjoin the relitigation of the action in a state
court.0 The federal anti-injunction statute was deemed to be
merely a declaratory enactment of the principles of comity and
mutual noninterference, and hence limited by the demands of
orderly disposal of suits in the dual judicial system20 Conversely,
a state court held that it could enjoin relitigation of adjudicated
issues in federal courts.2
In 1941, Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.,"2 an in personam
relitigation case, presented the relitigation exception to the Su-
Although the classification of cases as in rem or quasi in rem has fre-
quently been difficult, the distinction has persisted. Markham v. Allen, 326
U.S. 490 (1946); Mandeville v. Canterbury, 318 U.S. 47 (1948); United States
v. Klein, 803 U.S. 276 (1938). For a brief discussion of the problem see HART
& WECHsLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS DT THE FEDERAL Sysmt 1074 (1958).
Since separate judgments in the same in personam action can be satisfied
without a necessary conflict, the exclusive jurisdiction rationale generally
has not been applied to in personam cases. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., supra
at 85.
18. The relation of the res case exception to the principles underlying
the anti-injunction statute of 1793 was described in the majority opinion by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 814 U.S. 118,
185 (1941):
The Act of 1793 expresses the desire of Congress to avoid friction
between the federal government and the states resulting from the
intrusion of federal authority into the orderly functioning of a state's
judicial process. The reciprocal doctrine of the res cases is but an
application of the reason underlying the Act. Contest between the
representatives of two distinct judicial systems over the same physical
property would give rise to actual physical friction. The rule has be-
come well settled, therefore, that § 265 does not preclude the use of the
injunction by a federal court to restrain state proceedings seeking to
interfere with property in the custody of the court.
19. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Looney v.
Eastern Tex. R.R. 247 U.S. 214 (1918); see Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234 (1984); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 278 (1906); River-
dale Cotton Mills v. Alabama & Ga. Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 188 (1905); Julian
v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904); Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401
(1898); Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494 (1880); Dial v. Reynolds, 96
U.S. 340 (1877); French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1874).
0. E.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
21. Reagan v. Dick, 76 Colo. 544, 233 Fac. 159 (1925). Although this
case involved interference with possession and use of property, the Colorado
court allowed the State injunction on the grounds that the State court had
power to enjoin prosecution of a proceeding in a federal court involving con-
troversies already adjudicated in a state court. However, this case was never
considered by the Supreme Court.
22. 814 U.S. 118 (1941).
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preme Court. The Court, disallowing a federal injunction, point-
edly struck down the notion of a relitigation exception?" It held
that the anti-injunction statute was to be read literally and that
exceptions to the rule were to be limited to the ree cases24 and
express statutory exceptions? 5 A vigorous dissent 26 which later
became the basis for an amendment to the anti-injunction
statute, disputed the majority's assertion that Congress had
intended to reject the relitigation exception in the 1911 re-enact-
ment of the statute, and contended that the exception should be
allowed in order to eliminate wasteful relitigation and examina-
tion of res judicata in another forum?7 The dissent provides
28. The Toucey majority said that a judicial relitigation case exception
had not been before the Congress at the time of the 1911 amendment and
that congressional silence on the matter could not be construed as enactment.
Of the earlier cases which had appeared to support the relitigation exception,
the ones which were not branded as res cases were dismissed because "loose
language and a sporadic, ill-considered decision cannot be held to have im-
bedded in our law a doctrine which so patently violates the expressed pro-
hibition of Congress." 314 U.S. at 139.
24. "The rule of the res cases was unequivocally on the books when
Congress reenacted the original § 5 of the Act of 1793, first by Revised Statutes
of 1874 and later by the Judicial Code of 1911." Ibid. See note 18 supra for a
discussion of the rationale of permitting the res exception.
25. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 141 (1941). The
Court examined the exceptions created by Congress: (1) Bankruptcy pro-
ceedings: 36 Stat. 1162 (1911); (2) Removal of actions: 28 U.S.C. § 1442(b)
(1958); (3) Limitation of shipowners' liability: 9 Stat. 635, 686 (1851); (4)
Interpleader: 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958); (5) Frazier-Lemke Act: 47 Stat. 1473,
11 U.S.C. § 203(o) (1958).
q6. Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Roberts joined Mr. Justice
Reed in dissent. 314 U.S. at 141.
27.
This alternative [to permitting injunctions] is that a federal judgment
entered perhaps after years of expense in money and energy and after
the production of thousands of pages of evidence comes to nothing
that is final. It is to be only the basis for a plea of res judicata which
is to be examined by another court, unfamiliar with the record already
made, to determine whether the issues were or were not settled by
the former adjudication. We, too, desire that the difficulties innate in
the federal system of government may be smoothed away without a clash
of sovereignties but we find no cause for alarm in affirming a court
which forbids parties bound by its decree to fight the battle over on
another day and field. We should not, in reaching for theoretical sym-
metry, hamper the efficiency and needlessly break the continuity of our
judicial methodology. A decree forbidding a defeated party from set-
ting up any right, anywhere, based upon claims adjudged is the usual
form where injunctions are appropriate for determining controversies.
Id. at 144.
For a brief evaluation of Mr. Justice Reed's argument, see Note, 90 U.
PA. L. REv. 714, 724-25 (1942).
848 [Vol. 49:844
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further evidence of a policy of mutuality wherein no distinctions
should exist between federal and state court relitigation powers.
It cited Princess Lida v. Thompson,28 where a state court was
allowed to enjoin federal in rem proceedings, in support of its
contention that there are no effects sufficiently harmful to deny
the federal relitigation injunctiono
After Toucey, the federal statute was amended to allow a feder-
al court to enjoin state court proceedings where necessary "to pro-
tect or effectuate its judgments."30 The Reviser's notes specifical-
ly mention the Toucey opinion, and explain that the amendment
was intended to adopt the Toucey dissent and to restore the rule
as understood before Toucey.3' Since the 1948 amendment, two
Tenth Circuit cases involving control of property have relied
directly upon this specific expression of legislative intent to up-
hold federal relitigation injunctions."
The need to protect a court's judgments exists in both in
personam actions and res cases. Although the Tenth Circuit cases
interpreting the amendment involved property, neither these
opinions nor the Reviser's notes in any way suggest that the
res judgments alone were entitled to effectuation. Moreover,
Toucey, the effect of which the Reviser indicated was to be over-
come, was itself an in personam action. Prior to the instant case,
these considerations, coupled with an application of the tradi-
tional policy of mutuality and equal treatment, permitted the
assumption that a state court possessed the power to enjoin re-
litigation in a federal court of issues previously adjudicated by
the same parties in a state court.
28. 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
29. 814 U.S. at 144.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
31. The Reviser's notes to § 2283 explain:
The exceptions specifically include the words "to protect or effectu-
ate its judgments," for lack of which the Supreme Court held that the
Federal courts are without power to enjoin relitigation of cases and
controversies fully adjudicated by such courts. (See Toucey v. New
York Life Insurance Co ...... A vigorous dissenting opinion . . .
notes that at the time of the 1911 revision of the Judicial Code, the
power of the courts of the United States to protect their judgments
was unquestioned and that the revisers of that code noted no change
and Congress intended no change).
Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally
understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision.
H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 181-82 (1947).
32. Berman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 1952);
Jackson v. Carter Oil Co., 179 F.2d 524, 526 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 812 (1950).
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The Court in Donovan stressed that petitioners had a right
of action granted to them by Congress, and that while a full
hearing might have shown that the Texas court judgment barred
the issues in the federal suit, the question of res judicata was for
the federal court alone to decide. 3 But as the dissent correctly
argued, the petitioners' right to proceed in the federal court, as
well as the federal court's right to determine res judicata, were
precisely the questions in issue and were not proper bases for the
decision." It seems unlikely that the Court's denial of state power
to restrain a congressional right was based on the supremacy
clause.35 The majority cited early cases in support of its statement
that Congress "has in no way relaxed the old and well-established
judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without
power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions.
. . ."s The only rationale expressed in those cases is the mutual
separation and equal independence of state and federal courts in
their respective spheres of action.37
The Court may have been motivated by a desire to protect the
integrity and independence of the federal courts from interference
resulting from state prejudices." However, this view seems un-
warranted in relitigation cases. An argument that the States
would be depriving plaintiffs of a federal right seems answered
by the fact that plaintiffs were free to bring suit in the federal
court in the first instance had they so desired. Moreover, a state
injunction restraining plaintiffs from federal relitigation would
be subject to ultimate review by the Supreme Court. Although
it might be possible for state courts to subvert a party's right to
federal trial - for example, if the second action were not res
judicata and there were prolonged and unnatural delay in appeal-
ing the injunction through the state court channels - for the
3. 377 U.S. at 412.
34. Id. at 420.
35. The supremacy clause has not been utilized to prevent state court
injunctions against federal judicial proceedings where there is a need to
preserve harmonious relations between the concurrent sovereignties and to
avoid clashes of jurisdiction. These areas are distinguished from those where
the major concern is preservation of the federal government's paramount
authority. Note, 51 CoLUM. L. REv. 84, 85 (1951). For a good discussion of
the latter area, see Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal
Official, 73 YALE LJ. 1385 (1964).
86. 877 U.S. at 412-13.
37. United States v. Council of Keokuk, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 514, 517 (1867);
Weber v. Lee County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 210, 213 (1867); Riggs v. Johnson
County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 194-96 (1867). The earliest case cited, M'Kim
v. Voohies, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 279 (1812), expressed no grounds for the
decision.
38. See Note, 51 CoLum. L. REv. 84, 89 (1951).
350
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Court in Donovan to give credence to such a notion seems to sug-
gest a lack of integrity in the state judicial process. That the
instant Court made such a suggestion seems clear in view of the
obvious congressional recognition of the need to allow federal
in personam relitigation injunctions"o where the interest of the
federal courts in effectuating their judgments appears no more
compelling than the state courts' interest. The application of a
double standard in the relitigation area has the apparent effect
of prescribing for state courts an inferior and secondary status
and undermining a traditional concept of equality and mutual
independence.40
The reasons for allowing relitigation injunctions, regardless
of which court is first to adjudicate, are premised, as in the
res cases, upon practical considerations. Determination of the res
judicata question can be handled more expeditiously in the orig-
inal court, which is already familiar with the record and issues.41
Moreover, disposal by the original court insures that final de-
termination of the res judicata question would always occur
before trial of the second suit. In contrast, disposal of the ques-
tion by the second court might delay such final determination
until completion of the retrial.' These reasons are sufficient to
permit injunctive relief in all relitigation cases, but such relief
seems particularly appropriate in the instant case. After delaying
the runway project for two years during the first litigation,"4
plaintiffs again were permitted to block the project by the filing
of the second suit. The Texas Supreme Court found plaintiffs'
actions to be vexatious and harassing, and this finding was not
disputed by the instant Court. On the basis of that finding, the
dissent forcibly argued that an injunction should be issued and
cited ample authority permitting injunctions to prevent such
39. See note s0 supra. The Court mentioned in passing that Congress has
seen fit to authorize federal court restraint of state court proceedings "in
some special circumstances," implying that the instant case would not so
qualify were a federal court seeking the injunction. It is submitted, however,
that the Donovan case would have come within the special circumstances
provided for by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
40. See Arnold, supra note 35, at 1897.
41. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 144 (1941) (dissent-
ing opinion) (see note 27 supra).
42. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 73, and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958), an inter-
locutory appeal of the federal court's res judicata ruling, as a controlling
question of law which could materially advance the termination of the litiga-
tion, would reduce the possibility of added inconvenience of a second trial
on the merits before appellate review of the res judicata question. However,
if the interlocutory appeal were not allowed, the second trial would precede
the final ruling on res judicata.
43. See note 2 supra.
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harassing and vexatious litigation.44 Furthermore, time was a
crucial factor in the Donovan case. The City of Dallas consid-
ered the runway a needed public project, and the city's extensive
efforts to issue the bonds were within hours of consummation."
It can be assumed that the bond issuance had been scheduled
at a time to maximize its success. 6 In view of these facts, it is
difficult to justify awarding plaintiffs another hearing in a fed-
eral forum.
Congress has endeavored to provide injunctive powers allow-
ing federal courts to protect or effectuate their judgments 7 In
view of the legislative intent set forth in the Reviser's notes,48
the subsequent interpretation in the Tenth Circuit cases,"4 and
the need for prompt and final settlement of disputes, it is probable
that a federal court would have been permitted to enjoin similar
relitigation in a state court. The arguments are as forceful when
made in support of allowing state injunctions. Consistent with a
traditional policy of mutual separation and equal independence,
similar protection should be given final judgments of state courts.
Income Taxation: Capital Gains Treatment
of Lump-Sum Qualified Trust Distribution-
Change of Employers as "Separation From the Service"
The Waterman Corporation established a tax qualified em-
ployee trust retirement plan for the benefit of the taxpayer and
its other employees. The plan did not provide for lump-sum dis-
tributions on termination of a participating employee's service
but, in that event, made his accrued benefits payable as an an-
nuity commencing on his normal retirement date.' However, the
plan provided for lump-sum distributions at the option of the
trustee upon termination of the plan. Later, the C. Lee Company,
an unrelated corporation, purchased 99 per cent of the outstand-
ing Waterman stock and caused a new Waterman board of direc-
44. 377 U.S. at 415-18.
45. Brief for Respondent, pp. 5, 31, Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S.
408 (1964).
46. See, e.g., GElraoRN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 654 (4th ed. 1960);
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss 108-09 (1938).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
48. See note 81 supra.
49. See note 32 supra.
1. Thomas E. Judkins, 31 T.C. 1022, 1023 (1959), involved the same
qualified retirement plan as the instant case but it gave a more complete
listing of the facts.
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